The paper advocates for changes to normative aspects of belief management in applied research. The central push is to argue for methodologically-required choice to include the possibility of adopting the view that a given dataset contains insufficient regularities for predictive theorising. This is argued to be related to how we should understand differences between predictive and non-predictive knowledges, contrasting Crombie and Nesbit. The proposed direction may also support management practices under conditions of uncertainty.
Introduction

Just what is confirmation bias: belief in belief
The phrase 'confirmation bias' is well-known to scholars. It is usually taken to mean the presence of a bias in interpretation of data that encourages support for pre-existing knowledge. The most-cited work containing the phrase in its title is Nickerson 1998: 1 6 method, that come down to a procedural requirement that permits (and so also rejects) statements that 'here, we know that the unknown is unknowable'.
If knowability is associated with knowable cause-effect relations, then consider the design of structures facing risk of repeated stress leading to cracks that propagate fast or slowly, with high speeds of crack propagation being experienced as dangerous. It turns out that the social construction of knowledge that allows aeroplanes to be design, manufactured, sold and operated with reasonable levels of insurance relies upon predictive knowledge where no theory explains and predicts propagation speed:
Aircraft fuselage structure is a good example of structure that is based largely on a slow crack growth rate design. … The rate of fatigue crack propagation is determined by subjecting fatigue-cracked specimens, like the compact specimen used in fracture toughness testing, to constant-amplitude cyclic loading. The incremental increase in crack length is recorded along with the corresponding number of elapsed load cycles acquire stress intensity (K), crack length (a), and cycle count (N) data during the test.
[ NDT Resource Center 2013] In such situations 'confirmation bias'-if understood in terms of some theorised understanding -cannot operate. Such a bias seeks to defend belief in some knowable order, with order understood in terms of some theory expressed in cause-effect terms.
Interestingly, in this example the social construction of knowledge does not extend to the social construction of an analytical knowledge in the sense of a theory or model that so articulates a cause-effect logic that it can be used to make predictions. Science here argues that whilst we know what will happen, so far we know that we knowably do not know, in terms of a logical model, why. Some find this surprising.
But what criteria make such theories acceptable? As an example, we find, in the widely-cited Held et al 1999 the question asked -"What is globalisation and how should it be conceptualised?". Their particular criteria are:
"… any satisfactory account of globalization has to offer: a coherent conceptualisation; a justified account of causal logic; some clear propositions about historical periodization; a robust specification of impacts; and some sound reflections about the trajectory of the process itself" [14] This is an example of criteria for theory acceptance that relies upon confirmation bias, avoiding scepticism. The bias against scepticism has as one consequence that such theories are too readily taken as guides to action, each suggesting that their "justified account of causal logic" maps to observed reality and so to action conceived in causeeffect terms. This stance encourages recklessness.
To build this argument, I frame it in terms of the need for researchers to treat ignorance 4 and knowledge -knowability and unknowability -as a duality, as ready to report the one as the other. I attack the 'belief in belief' that underpins confirmation bias, and to do this I examine different knowledge production methods by looking at different sets of criteria for the acceptability of accounts.
Palliative response
This paper has some suggestions for how confirmation bias arises and how palliative responses may be emerging. Palliative here implies measures that mitigate or ease costs, without actually solving the underlying problem; as the saying goes, 'like a blood transfusion for Keith Richard', it helps, but it does not solve the problem.
Philosophy and a social epistemological lens
It is perhaps self-evident that there is a difference between an account of something, and what that account might be said to be about. Distinguishing between the two is foundational to discussion of how things should be explained, predicted or whatever else an account is said to do. Indeed, a basic term we use to discuss accounts, that of the metaphor, etymologically links 'model and muddle' by suggesting that a modela metaphorical account -must 'bear' or carry something across the gap between the two.
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Students may confuse reality and accounts of reality, but they are taught and learn that this can be unwise. The utility of accounts of reality is evidently varied, but an important value of accounts is that they enable us to think in those terms, rather than
having to experience what it is said they are about. The value of theory is thus precisely that it is not reality, but about it, although just what we mean by 'about' varies. Some people find it useful to consider that accounts can be true, others that the very notion of truth is confusing and confused. My main point here is that use of an account of reality to think about reality requires the account, which is unreal, to bear a burden of belief. Thus disbelief has to be suspended if the account is to be a 9 believable account of reality; put this way, the core issue here is the management of movements between belief and disbelief: how we manage accounts and their believability. The importance of acting … results immediately from the characteristics of war. War is the domain of uncertainty, friction and, often, sheer chaos. … When the unexpected occurs, those waiting for new orders will lose. … auftragstaktik is one way to call forth … quick and independent action [Hoffman 1994:3] Hoffman offers an account of a practice -combat -and here reports that this practice asserts that belief that war is predictably regular is a mistake, and should be suspended: statements about reality in this context that assert their own predictive truth would not be accepted.
To take another example, discussion of ways in which belief and disbelief are managed and constructed is often associated with analyses of science practicespecifically, those elements of normative practice that state what correct practice is.
Thus Crombie, in a study of the historical origins of science, focusses upon method or procedure: recognisable social practices said capable of producing knowledge within that practice:
The history of science shows that the most striking changes are nearly always brought about by new conceptions of scientific procedure [Crombie 1953:1] Such conceptions of procedure reveal attitudes towards belief: here that better methods produce better statements about reality that should command acceptance and belief.
Nisbet 1969, by contrast, offers an account of Western theories of development and social change. He concludes that this broad tradition has consistently over time applied certain criteria: accounts of change here (which he says have dominated Western thought) are not intended to map reality closely, but rather offer metaphorical accounts of the essential aspects of change.
It is … however, the principal argument of this book that the metaphor … {is} much more than adornments of thought and language. {It is} quite inseparable from some of the profoundest currents in Western thought on society and change. They were inseparable in ancient Greek thought and in the thought of the centuries which followed the Greeks; and they remain closely involved in premises and preconceptions regarding the nature of change which we find in contemporary social theory [8, 9] By contrast, Crombie' In re-examining auftragstaktik we thus find an example that requires belief that relevant reality is chaotic and unpredictable; Hoffman reports a situation where experts are required to suspend belief in the predictability of war (officers on training courses would fail if they asserted otherwise). In contrasting Nisbet with Crombie we Box 1: Nisbet's seven criteria "From the metaphor came the {first} notion of change as natural to each and every living entity, social as well as biological, as something as much a part of its nature as structure and process. Second, social change -that is, natural change, was regarded as immanent, as proceeding from forces or provisions within the entity. Third, change, under this view is continuous, which is to say that change may be conceived as manifesting itself in sequential stages which have genetic relation to one another; they are cumulative. Fourth, change is directional; it can be seen as a single process moving cumulatively from a given point in time to another point' Fifth, change is necessary; it is necessary because it is natural, because it is as much an attribute of a living thing as is form or substance. Sixth, change in society corresponds to differentiation; its characteristic pattern is from the homogenous to the heterogeneous. Seventh, the change that is natural to an entity is the result of uniform processes; processes which inhere in the very structure of the institution of culture, and which may be assumed to have been the same yesterday as they are today" [212, underlining added] learn how social norms involved in knowledge production may or may not contain a criterion to govern convergence. We may conclude that this is what prediction is all about: to understand, say, engineering theory it is far less necessary to understand factors outside the practice than, say, economics, and whilst the former is reliant upon predictive power, the latter clearly is not [Yonay 1998; Fforde 2013] .
To recapitulate, statements of suitable method going back to Grosseteste (in Crombie's account) require movement between the inductive and deductive; between theorisation and confrontation of deductions from theory with facts. Since theory is not reality, but some account of it, disbelief is suspended to give suitable meaning to theorisation ('to theorise, you have to believe in your theory'). This allows theorisation to engage with facts (not yet predictively), for belief in the possible value and validity of theory encourages theorisation, just as it encourages confirmation bias.
The distinction between induction, when theory is developed to match facts, and deduction, when theory is used to deduce assertions about reality -predictions -that can then be tested empirically, is the core of this. Crombie's point is that Grosseteste added empirical testing to a far older view (and procedure) which asserted how knowledge was to be created (that is, that the right criteria to apply to assess a candidate for knowledge creation) as psychological powers (nous) showed the theorist the path forward.
Underpinning method, though, is belief that there is something knowable: that there is something present in reality that makes theorisation viable. Applying Nisbet's criteria, this is simply production of an empirically-founded metaphorical account meeting the criteria. Applying Crombie's, theory must be predictively powerful. Obviously, there is no a priori reason to expect theory in a particular context to be able to do either of these things: the data may not exhibit suitable regularities and/or the theorist may lack whatever it takes. Theorisation may thus fail, but in these two accounts fail for very different reasons.
In Crombie's framing, the shift between induction and deduction is a shift between suspension of disbelief and its reinstatement. The obvious risk is that, belief in theory having being encouraged during the induction phase, belief may not then be suspended as the deductive moment requires. Therefore, it is permitted to believe in the truth of theory in the inductive phase, but the normative criteria are violated if the researcher does not suspend this belief as they deduce testable predictions. This starts to look like a story about confirmation bias.
One can think of an 'inductive box' into which theory-making must be put for it to then re-emerge so that theory can drive deduction and empirical engagement, to seek and (perhaps or perhaps not) gain status as more than 'just theory'. 6 In these terms, Grosseteste, his theorising soul warmed by proximity to his God (or so he believed)
did not get out of the inductive box. Confirmation bias can be seen as the tendency to stay within the inductive box, which, as Crombie's history shows, was there very early on. Improved method here must therefore assert the value of scepticism. It must be socially acceptable, in terms of normative procedure, to believe that the particular context is unknowable (as crack propagation speed is, in terms of theorisation of cause and effect).
The analysis offers two insights:
• First, that predictability is a criterion within some but not all knowledge practices that requires comparison of theories, and pushes for convergence;
• Second, that the acceptability of non-predictive accounts is related to the shared criteria they meet (Nisbet's) Only if the data will carry it, and the theory created is good enough, will accounts add predictive power; otherwise, if we follow Nisbet and Crombie we expect that accounts meet only those criteria required of metaphorical accounts, and pressure for convergence lie outside the knowledge practice's own method. In a tolerant environment, perhaps they will exist in a world of multiple truths; if not, perhaps the Prince will decide on the truth of the matter.
7 Although I do not develop the argument here, the essentialist nature of theories of social change in Nisbet's account can be taken to imply that their terms do not have determinate meanings, viewed epistemically. Does this imply that such accounts necessarily entail ontological instability, so that for their accompanying statistical empirics sampling cannot be said to be from a single population, so that results are necessarily spurious?
Contemporary social science
Action and predictive social theory
The validity of a theory as a guide to action, when it has not been tested deductively, appears often to be high. The sense of negative here is that the hoped-for predictive power of what was replaced had been found to be absent (policy 'had not worked'). Though, recall that Nisbet concluded that Western theories of social change are judged by a range of criteria that do not include predictive power (see Box 1). Their relationship to reality, in a long historical tradition, is metaphorical. Such theories of social change, when, for example, they say that policy X will cause Y, are necessarily (unless by chance) bad guides to action. Now, it is evident that belief that such social theories map easily to reality, in effect predictively, is nevertheless common [Friedman 2006 reflecting on Converse 1964 ].
Yet whilst metaphorical accounts in Nisbet's sense have empirical foundations, these
are not predictive, and should not be expected to be so, given the contrasts between the different criteria of the different methods Nisbet and Crombie report.
Consider a recent development in philosophy: 'agnotology' -the 'study of ignorance'. This easily becomes the study, not of situations where there is suspension of belief in possible theory -a choice to believe in ignorance as unknowability -but rather where ignorance is seen when true knowledge is possible but obscured or prevented by the presence of an untrue set of beliefs. 9 Confirmation bias is present here, as the focus entails belief in knowability, and the issue in agnotology is to examine how knowability is stymied. Scepticism is devalued.
Weiss 2012 thus builds upon others' work to examine agnotology mainly as "how real-world facts can be manipulated or ignorance actually generated when information is distorted by obscured by special interests, as exemplified by tobacco companies'
fight to prevent the evil leaf from being controlled …" [96] . The paper has no empirical referents linked to the algebra deployed. His reference to "final results" is thus a remark about the theory, not its relationship to reality: it is a remark about the effects of variation in the algebraic formulation of the issue upon the results of the model in terms of the model alone: his article, seminal in the field, reports on theorizing.
10 It would be easy but is not really necessary to present historical examples of application of allegedly predictively known economic relationships to policy, with poor results; recent ones would be the Asian Financial Crisis, the Global Financial Crisis and austerity policies.
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Two generations later, at the World Bank Symposium, organized by an institution committed to the idea that it had expertise in knowing how to change rates of economic growth, Solow stated:
I have been skeptical from the beginning about the interpretation of cross-country growth regressions [283] Other contributors to the collection argued in terms of knowable but incomplete knowledge. After decades of research, no predictive knowledge had been found, yet theory, despite the scepticism of a key creator of it, remained valued as a basis for action -for policy advice. And, as I discuss in the next section, what is striking is the methodological inability to accept ignorance in the sense of their being nothing to know: unknowability.
The cross-country growth regressions literature: research as guide to action?
This paper arose originally from an interest in understanding belief in the knowability of change processes, in terms of cause-effect relations and the predictive viability of policy advice (that X will lead to Y), especially in the field of international development. 11 Econometric cross-country growth studies therefore purport to look for reliable evidence for the causes of differing economic growth performance.
However, examination will easily show a plethora of published but contradictory results: there is no apparent convergence, and this is a stable characteristic of the literature.
In this literature, lack of convergence in turn generated empirical investigation. However, some authors did take on board the possibility that the data could be interpreted as advising that the situation was unknowable in its own terms. Kenny and Williams 2001 argued that it told us that the research was assuming ontological universalism -sampling from a single population -so that the evidence was and in Fforde 2016 forthcoming, economists are more inclined to be trapped in an 'inductive box', failing to return to disbelief in theory and adopt a skepticism as deductions from it are confronted with data.
suggesting that cause-effect relations between policies and economic performance were unknowable in the terms of the dataset. GDP here and GDP there were essentially different, but theory assumed they were not. This supported (though amongst only a minority) a sceptical position, mitigating the general tendency to confirmation bias. Thus Wood (1994) :
The value of this message is clear… None of us…will ever rely so casually and so heavily upon Economic theories about change are algebraic in form and contain variables that refer to time -'t'. This is readily interpreted as meaning that the theory is potentially predictive. Equally clearly, however, the criteria applied are not those that seek predictive power. Economists engage with data in fairly rigorous ways, but their theories do not generate predictive power and it seems are not intended to, as their method does not require it. To quote researchers looking at what economists do when they model [Yonay and Breslau 2006] :
What is distinctive about model-building in economics is the process that mediates between the microworld [the economic models] and the ostensible object of the research. Rather than involving scientific instruments or data-gathering procedures, this mediation is accomplished by vaguely defined but generally accepted conventions regarding the movement from reality to models. . . .
There is no pretence that the model actually resembles reality. Rather, the concern with realism is a concern with the plausibility of the mediation between the reality and the model. [33] [34] The majority of economists stress the importance of a model's being based upon rigorous statements of the nature of, and the modelling implied by, their understanding of and belief in rational behaviour. From a Crombian perspective, there is nothing remarkable here -this is simply the chosen theoretical framework. A model, however motivated, that does not appear founded on such statements is therefore not highly valued; and the discipline -again unremarkably -polices its statements about reality by reference to such boundaries. She argues that many economic arguments confuse judgments about economic significance with judgments about statistical significance. As she puts it:
The numbers are necessary material. But they are not sufficient to bring the matter to a scientific conclusion. Only the scientists can do that, because "conclusion" is a human idea, not Nature's. It is a property of human minds, not of the statistics. [112] And:
It is not true, as most economists think, that . . . statistical significance is a preliminary screen, a necessary condition, through which empirical estimates should be put. Economists will say, "Well, I want to know if the coefficient exists, don't I?" Yes, but statistical significance can't tell you.
Only the magnitude of the coefficient, on the scale of what counts in practical, engineering terms as nonzero, tells you. It is not the case that statistically insignificant coefficients are in effect zero.
[118]
These arguments are suggestive. Centrally, as comparison between Nisbettian and
Crombian criteria showed, the method of the former, unlike the latter, gives no way to decide between competing theories. This has to be dealt with outside the method. It is then made easier to report the finding of patterns, for different patterns may legitimately be found in the same data: a world of multiple truths. And this is just what we find in the cross-country growth econometrics.
We can add to this. For example, it is a knowable result in econometrics that the results of estimations can be spurious, in the sense that, for reasons to do with the nature of assumptions held to be true to generate them, they are best treated as neither true nor false, but empty of meaning. Granger 1990 and Granger and Newbold 1974 report positive correlations between variables derived from sets of random numbers.
Patterns can be found using these methods where none exist.
I conclude that researchers may be thought of as treating belief asymmetrically: rather than choice between ignorance and knowledge -knowability and unknowabilitybeing seen (and method requiring it be seen) as necessary, the socially normative focus (the method used) is upon the acquisition of knowledge, albeit perhaps with a degree of uncertainty associated with it. In the inductive box, whilst theorising, belief is needed; for Nisbet, viewed from a Crombie perspective, this is the end of it, for there is no criterion requiring any more to be done: in a nutshell, method entails confirmation bias. This would seem to be the case for any knowledge production process that lacks a criterion equivalent to prediction that requires comparison between accounts, and which, following Nisbet, is metaphorical.
What the growth literature case study shows us is therefore, first, that most practitioners do not question these assumptions, though they could. The issue is one of method; method can be changed, but it is not. I now develop an argument based upon existing statistical methodologies that offers a conceptual test for whether it is wise to believe that there is a knowable order, and so to step into the inductive box.
This is a method for judging whether the data supports this or not. This offers an operationalization of the idea that ignorance and knowledge are part of a duality, so, as choice between them is inevitable, it is a good idea to work out how to manage it. It seems, though, that the cultural and one could say metaphysical predilections are towards belief in knowability, in the presence of a knowable order, so that such suggestions are not likely to be more than palliative. Whether this particular method is a good one or not, though, the point stands: in terms of procedure, it is a good idea to better manage pressure for confirmation bias by supporting in principle judgements of ignorance -of unknowability in particular contexts. There should be a right to scepticism.
How to avoid the inductive box?
Most statistical work, including that used in the growth economics literature, develops methods familiar from statistical hypothesis testing. Based upon a set of assumptions,
an estimated value of a variable has an associated estimated probability distribution.
Thus, within certain limits and based upon certain assumptions, the researcher can make a judgement about the relationship between the estimated value of the variable and the population value that would be measured if the entire population were surveyed. These certain limits and assumptions include some metric that helps the researcher reach a conclusion and this is probably the familiar confidence level (5%, 10%). More generally, such procedures contain a 'hurdle', which is in integral part of the method by which the researcher draws their conclusions.
The quote from Cohen 1984 given above suggests that a researcher must predicate the truth of any conclusion upon the assumption that certain things are true. There must be confidence of enough regularity in the data to justify theorisation. More importantly for the argument here, researchers in practice assume that the confidence level is a given, conventionally at the 5% or 10% level. Now, one can ask, for the given statistical procedure, an inverse question, which is at which confidence level should a researcher conclude that because there is not enough regularity in the data (robust relations between cause and effect variables) they should not try to theorise: they should be able to assert that any reality 'behind the data' is too unknowable. This question is not usually asked, is not part of standard procedure, and the choice is not guided empirically. Such choice can, however, be guided by the following considerations.
In the limited bounds robustness-testing techniques, such that used by Levine & Zervos, and in the application of Bayesian techniques [Fforde & Parker 2012] , researchers' practices can be seen in different ways deploying a hurdle to permit them to gauge whether they should conclude that a relationship exists. The placing of this hurdle is not a property either of the data or of the model proposed. So we can ask the inverse question: for each practice, and dataset, at which hurdle height should a researcher report no known relationship to exist.
Researchers conventionally do not ask this question, which appears in part to be because of the assumption that knowledge -knowability -is, not part of a dual containing ignorance -unknowability -but a truth that researchers assume they may know, and whose parameters are to be estimated empirically, albeit with a degree of uncertainty. In other words it is assumed that theorisation is always worthwhile; by entering the inductive box (theorising) it has already been assumed, in this social practice, that there is a pattern to be found. If there is evidence (as we found in Levine & Zervos) that this is not the case, this is easily rejected and the choice made to maintain suspension of disbelief and assertion that the model works.
In the robustness testing techniques applied by Levine & Zervos, the hurdle is a given confidence limit used to gauge whether relationships between exogenous variables and others are as desired.
If we change the hurdle value to make it harder to find results, fewer results are found.
Obviously we can then find the value at which there are (just) no robust relations.
This then a valuable characteristic of the dataset, and we call this the Paine Index. The level of the Paine Index can be used to tell researchers whether there is adequate regularity in the dataset to justify theorisation -to getting into the inductive box.
What Hoffman is saying about auftragstaktik is equivalently that, based upon what they knew about war, the Paine Index or some equivalent was found to be at a level that implied that "War is the domain of uncertainty, friction and, often, sheer chaos."
By contrast, datasets about iron smelting or crack propagation speed (see above)
would generate values justifying theorisation as these were, on the contrary, domains of order and relative certainty. Gillespie's remarks offer a path into a conceptual discussion of the duality of ignorance and knowledge -knowability and unknowability -that is I think too often implicit in empirical practice. It offers a way to understand (and so better to deal with)
Confirmation bias and belief in revelatory knowledge
how what I am calling the suspension of disbelief is powered and driven by belief in belief, which in my terms makes it too easy for practitioners to avoid the "double, inductive-deductive procedure" and remain in the inductive box. As is familiar from many areas, including international development practice [Fforde 2009 [Fforde , 2013 , people appear very often to believe that what they happen to believe is true, and are happy with this despite evidence pointing the other way. They like confirmation bias despite the risks. This seems to be in part because the norms of their method give them reasons to believe in their theories and continue to believe in them as true, thus continuing to suspend disbelief in them (for they are but theories).
Yet a minority of the citations of Levine & Zervos reported in Fforde 2005 can be understood as shifting towards more sceptical ways of doing research, and so it appears that there is some hope that the effects of confirmation bias can be mitigated, even if its origins are so culturally-deep that a cure is far away.
Conclusions
My discussion of the nature of the conceptual underpinnings of empirical work suggests that framing judgements in terms of a duality of ignorance and knowledge informs us about how we may better manage belief. The core issue is how, when we fear we may lack predictive knowledge, we manage method. The Paine Index -or some equivalent -offers a tool to include in method to assess whether it is worthwhile, for a give dataset, to assume knowledge or ignorance, and so to avoid theorising. More generally, it shows how method can be changed to include a judgement that there is not enough regularity to justify suspending disbelief in theory and entering the inductive box.
We do not escape from our choices by privileging -by accepting confirmation biasthe acquisition of knowledge compared with the acceptance of ignorance. This is, I
have argued, to choose to put ourselves in an inductive box and preserve a suspension of disbelief that is meant to be only temporary. It seems better to improve ways of avoiding the inductive box. With much policy guided by claims to predictive power, and where choices to believe are usually implicit, we risk much when our method of knowledge production include choices about what to believe that we are too often unaware of. Without realising this, in many areas of applied research it is too hard to assert ignorance, and behave in whatever ways suit that, and too easy to assert knowledge; this is risky and can be reckless and so unethical -and those seen as unethical risk loosing prestige and authority [1990, 1997] .
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